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ABSTRACT: Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. 
However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is 
prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge 
norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most 
developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-
level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), 
so that knowledge-based assessments would be a good heuristic for practical reasoning and 
epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. 
First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency 
hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also 
endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support 
the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. 
Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more 
likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc 
than Normal Coincidence. 
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1. Introductory Remarks 
We often say things like 
 “You knew that p (e.g., that he is allergic to peanuts). Why didn’t you tell me?” 
 “She did well to do A (e.g., to check), for she had insufficient evidence.” 
This suggests that there is an epistemic norm governing action.1 This norm is 
supposed to tell us which epistemic condition must be satisfied to rationally (or 
                                                        
1 Although see Davide Fassio, “Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning,” 
Philosophical Studies 174, 9 (2017), for the idea that such epistemic evaluations concern 
regulation conditions rather than a (sui generis) epistemic norm of practical reasoning.  On the 
distinction between norms and regulation conditions, see also Pascal Engel, “Belief and 
Normativity,” Disputatio 2, 23 (2007) and “In What Sense Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?” 
Grazer Philosophische Studien 77, 1 (2008). 
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appropriately) use a certain consideration as a reason for action.2 There is no 
consensus on what the relevant epistemic condition is.3 Still, everybody accepts 
that ‘know’ is a prominent term of ordinary epistemic assessments of action and 
that this fact constitutes some evidence in favour of the knowledge account. Thus, 
any opponent of the knowledge account must offer a plausible explanation of it. 
Mikkel Gerken, an opponent of the knowledge norm, has recently offered 
the most promising and developed explanation of the required sort. This 
explanation is based on the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level 
warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient for action (Normal 
                                                        
2 The supposed norm has received different formulations. Some philosophers formulate the norm 
in terms of a condition for the rationality of action, others in terms of a condition for the 
appropriateness, warrant or permissibility of action. What the norm is supposed to govern is also 
expressed in various ways, for example in terms of “acting as if p,” “acting for the reason that p,” 
“treating p as a reason,” “acting on p,” “using p as a premise in one’s practical reasoning and 
action” etc. Although these differences in formulation may matter (see Ram Neta, “Treating 
Something as a Reason for Action,” Noûs 43, 4 (2009): 684-686; Mikkel Gerken, “Warrant and 
Action,” Synthese 178, 3 (2011): 535n9) they won't concern us here. 
3 Some philosophers say that it is knowledge. See e.g. John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Timothy Williamson, “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive 
Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly 55, 219 (2005); John 
Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” Journal of Philosophy 105, 10 (2008). 
Other theorists argue that it is knowledge-level justification. See for example Jeremy Fantl and 
Matthew McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Clayton Littlejohn, “Must We Act Only on What We Know?” Journal of Philosophy 106, 8 
(2009); Clayton Littlejohn, Justification and the Truth-connection (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). According to Neta, “Treating Something,” it is justification to believe 
that one knows. Some other writers think that the epistemic norm provides an epistemic 
condition sensitive to the practical context. See, among others, Jessica Brown, “Subject-Sensitive 
Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning,” Noûs 42, 2 (2008); Baron Reed, 
“A Defense of Stable Invariantism,” Noûs 44, 2 (2010); Gerken, “Warrant and Action;” Mikkel 
Gerken, “The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment,” European Journal of 
Philosophy 23, 1 (2015); Mikkel Gerken, On Folk Epistemology. How We Think and Talk about 
Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Dustin Locke, “Practical 
Certainty,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90, 1 (2015). Finally, there are 
philosophers who embrace a pluralist view according to which there are various epistemic 
norms. See in particular Janet Levin, “Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of 
Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76, 2 (2008). 
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Coincidence), so that knowledge-based evaluation constitutes a good heuristic for 
evaluating action and practical reasoning. 4 
In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that 
Normal Coincidence (NC) is ad hoc. It relies on an unsupported frequency 
assumption that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that 
Gerken also endorses.5 Second, I show that, in any case, NC is insufficient to 
support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation constitutes a good 
heuristic, for NC does not exclude that knowledge-level warrant is not frequently 
necessary and sufficient for appropriate action, nor that knowledge-level warrant is 
not sufficiently close to the degree of warrant which is (very) frequently necessary 
and sufficient for action. Third, I consider three alternative frequency hypotheses 
close to NC but apparently more fit to support the hypothesis that knowledge-
based assessment of action constitutes a good heuristic. I show that they are even 
more ad hoc than NC. 
My plan is as follows. In section 2, I clarify the claim that knowledge-based 
assessments are prominent in ordinary epistemic assessments of action by 
distinguishing three ways in which that is the case and how NC is supposed to 
explain this. In section 3, I explain why NC is ad hoc and insufficient and why the 
three alternatives are even more ad hoc. In section 4, I anticipate a possible reply 
appealing to the distinction between normal and abnormal situations and I show 
that it is unsatisfactory.  
2. Explaining the Prominence of ‘Know’ in Epistemic Assessments of Actions 
2.1 Three Ways in Which ‘Know’ Is Prominent 
There are at least three ways in which the word ‘know’ is prominent in epistemic 
assessments of action. First, ‘know’ seems to be the default word of epistemic 
assessments of action. To see this, consider the following case, from Hawthorne 
and Stanley: 
RESTAURANT. Hannah and Sarah are trying to find a restaurant, at which they 
have time-limited reservations. Instead of asking someone for directions, Hannah 
goes on her hunch that the restaurant is down a street on the left. After walking 
for some amount of time, it   becomes quite clear that they went down the wrong 
                                                        
4 Gerken, “The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions” and On Folk Epistemology.   
5 Gerken, “Warrant and Action” and On Folk Epistemology. 
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street.6 
In this situation, it may be granted that Hannah’s action is wrong because a 
mere hunch that p is insufficient to act on p. However, as Hawthorne and Stanley 
emphasize, 
[a] natural way for Sarah to point out that Hannah made the wrong decision is to 
say, “You shouldn’t have gone down this street, since you didn't know that the 
restaurant was here.”7  
Here, we may think that the use of ‘know’ is natural in the sense that, by 
default (in the absence of further information), it is appropriate to use ‘know’ 
rather than, e.g., ‘justified’ (or ‘rational’) belief. The fact that ‘know’ is the 
appropriate default term of evaluation constitutes a first way in which ‘know’ is 
prominent. Call this ‘the default claim:’ 
Default claim: ‘know’ is the default term of epistemic assessments of action. 
It is also remarkable that ‘know’ is the most frequently used term in our 
epistemic assessments of action.8 This fact constitutes a second way in which 
‘know’ is prominent. Call this ‘the frequency claim:’ 
Frequency claim: ‘know’ is the most frequently used term for epistemic 
assessment of action 
Finally, ‘knowledge’ questions and ascriptions always sound relevant and 
appropriate when it comes to making a practical decision. As Reed (an opponent of 
the knowledge norm) writes: 
[Y]ou are trying to decide whether to check if the train stops in Foxboro because 
it is extremely important that you get there as quickly as possible. You have not 
yet decided whether it is rational to check if the train makes that stop. One of the 
relevant factors in your decision would presumably be an answer to the question, 
do you know the train will stop there?9  
                                                        
6 Hawthorne and Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 571. 
7 Hawthorne and Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 571. 
8 As far as I know, no systematic study showing that ‘know’ is prominent in epistemic appraisal 
of action has ever been conducted, but ‘know’ is one of the ten words most used (see Gerken, On 
Folk Epistemology, 15) and, to my knowledge, all philosophers agree with the frequency claim. 
9 Reed, “A Defense of Stable Invariantism,” 232. 
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We should also note that a positive answer to a ‘knowledge’ question is 
always decisive for action, even when the stakes are high.10 For example, suppose 
you ask Jill whether you should take a certain train. Suppose she tells you “I know 
that this train will stop there. You should take it!” It would be quite odd for you to 
reply “But the question is not whether you know!” By saying “I know that this 
train will stop there,” Jill provides you with appropriate information with respect 
to whether you should take this train and act on the proposition that the train will 
stop there. The third way in which ‘know’ is prominent has to do with the role 
that ‘know’ plays in appropriate questions and recommendations when it comes to 
action. Call this the ‘guidance claim:’ 
Guidance claim: ‘know’ is always appropriate in questions and recommendations 
about what to do. 
The fact that ‘know’ is prominent in epistemic assessments of action 
constrains any satisfactory account to provide a plausible explanation of this 
phenomenon.11 Of course, the offered explanation has to be consistent with the 
assumed epistemic norm. This constitutes a challenge for philosophers rejecting 
the knowledge norm.12   
2.2. Explaining the Prominence of ‘Know’ on the Basis of Normal Coincidence 
Gerken is a classical invariantist about knowledge. According to him, the epistemic 
standards for knowledge (or ‘know’) do not shift with the practical context of the 
subject (or of the attributor). Regarding the epistemic norm of action, Gerken 
                                                        
10 See Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, “On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, 3 (2007): 562. 
11 Gerken explicitely understands the prominency claim as a frequency claim  given normal 
situations: 
Prominence of ‘Knowledge’ In normal cases of epistemic assessment of action and 
assertion, ordinary speakers frequently use the term ‘knowledge’ and its cognates 
(Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 17). 
But, as I explain below, he also grants that ‘know’ is the default term (and that the concept 
knowledge is the default concept) of epistemic assessments, and that ‘knowledge’ ascriptions 
have a “directive force” for action. 
12 Proponents of the knowledge account face a different challenge, though, that of explaining 
why we do not always use ‘know’ to assess actions. See Brown, “Subject-sensitive Invariantism” 
and Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 18. 
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embraces the warrant account, according to which the epistemic norm of action 
provides different epistemic standards associated with different deliberative 
contexts, where a deliberative context is determined by a set of practical factors. 
More precisely: 
Warrant Account (WA). In the deliberative context, DC, S meets the epistemic 
conditions on rational use of (her belief that) p as a premise in practical reasoning 
or of (her belief that) p as a reason for acting (if and) only if S is warranted in 
believing that p to a degree that is adequate relative to DC.13 
The notion of warrant that Gerken invokes is non-factive. Therefore, on this 
view, knowledge is never necessary to warrant action. The notion of warrant is 
also gradable, and the practical factors that determine the degree of warrant which 
is adequate include in particular the urgency of action, the availability of evidence 
and other options, the stakes, and the social role of the agent.  
In order to explain the prominence of ‘know,’ Gerken appeals to the 
frequency assumption that, in normal cases, knowledge-level warrant is frequently 
necessary and very frequently sufficient: 
Normal Coincidence (NC). In normal cases of epistemic assessment, the degree of 
warrant necessary for S’s knowing that p is frequently necessary and very 
frequently sufficient for the epistemic permissibility of S’s acting on (the belief 
that) p.14 
It’s important to note that by ‘normal,’ Gerken does not mean the most 
frequent for an individual. As we will see, according to him, a surgeon may 
frequently face an abnormal situation (see the discussion in section 4). 
How is NC supposed to explain the prominence of ‘know’? The idea seems to 
be that if NC is correct then, in normal situations, it is frequently right, or at least 
frequently sufficiently close to being right, to use this term. This would explain the 
frequency claim.15  
                                                        
13 Gerken, “Warrant and Action,” 530. 
14  Gerken, “The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions” and On Folk Epistemology, 143. 
15 Note, though, that ‘know’ is a factive term. If the warrant required for action is never factive, it 
is odd that we use a factive term. Gerken acknowledges this point and appeals to the idea that 
‘know’ is learnt before other epistemic terms (see Gerken, “The Roles of Knowledge 
Ascriptions”). Perhaps Gerken could also say that, typically, what is knowledge-level warranted 
is believed and true, and hence, known, so that there is a rough coincidence between what is 
knowledge-level warranted and what is known. See also the discussion of Douven below. 
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NC could also explain the default claim. Again, assume that, given NC, 
knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and sufficient in normal 
situations, or at least sufficiently close to the required warrant for action. Then, 
epistemic assessments of action in terms of knowledge could be seen as relying on a 
good heuristic process appealing to knowledge as a good “cognitive proxy.”16 This 
strategy would manage to “provide a good trade-off between accuracy and 
communicative effectiveness.”17 This approach has it that we use the concept 
knowledge by default in our epistemic assessments. Indeed, default 
conceptualisations must be informative and easy to process. We may think that 
conceptualisations in terms of know are better placed than others in this respect. 
More fine-grained conceptualisations (in terms of seeing, remembering, etc.) 
would be more costly, involving the multiplication of more complex heuristics. In 
contrast, by using the concept knowledge in our epistemic assessments, we could 
use this concept as a middle-term in heuristic inferences like, for example,  
knowledge-output heuristics (e.g., from “S said that p,” to “S knows that p”) and 
knowledge-input heuritics (e.g., from “S knows that p” and “S knows that q,” to “S 
knows that r”). More coarse-grained conceptualisations (e.g., in terms of belief or 
reliable belief), on the other hand, would involve too great an information loss.18 If 
the concept know is the concept we use by default to make epistemic assessments 
of action, it’s not surprising that we use the word ‘know’ by default in these 
assessments (since ‘know’ expresses the concept know). 
Let us now turn to the guiding claim according to which ‘know’ is 
prominent in the sense that ‘know(s)’ questions and ascriptions are always 
appropriate and relevant when it comes to making a practical decision. To explain 
this phenomenon, Gerken invokes a supposed pragmatic feature of ‘knowledge’ 
ascriptions.19 The starting idea is that an assertion that p can have different 
illocutionary effects, and hence, fulfil different communicative functions. A 
potential illocutionary effect of assertions is that of  recommending a certain 
course of action. For example, by asserting “The window is open,” you can perform 
the indirect speech act of commanding someone to close the window. Likewise, 
‘knowledge’ ascriptions are assertions. They can serve the communicative function 
of directing action. As with conversational implicatures, the directive force 
                                                        
16 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 149. 
17 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 190. 
18 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 101-104. 
19 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, ch. 8. 
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associated with ‘knowledge’ ascriptions is to some extent context-dependent. We 
can then distinguish particularised implicatures which heavily rely on the 
particularity of the context and the background assumptions ascribed to the 
interlocutors, and generalised implicatures, which constitute the default 
interpretation of the speech act. For example, “Can you pass the salt?” generally 
implicates a request for the salt. This is the default interpretation. 
Given that an implicature can depend more or less on the context, Gerken 
articulates a notion of more or less regularised implicature, whereby it is registered 
how strongly the implicature depends on the particularity of the context. He 
proposes to say that in contexts where the question is to decide what to do, 
‘knowledge’ ascriptions have a highly regularised directive illocutionary effect, 
such that the default interpretation is a recommendation to act in a certain way.  
A possible worry here is that we cannot just assume that there is a highly 
regularised directive illocutionary effect associated with ‘knowledge’ ascriptions. 
As DeRose notes, an explanation postulating that ‘knowledge’ ascriptions have a 
pragmatic meaning besides their semantic meaning would be plainly ad hoc.20 
However, Gerken's pragmatic explanation partially relies on the claim that the 
concept knowledge is the default concept of epistemic assessments. As he writes: 
If the concept knowledge is used by default in intuitive epistemic judgments, it is 
reasonable to assume that the word ‘knowledge’ is used in a similar manner as a 
communicative heuristic. 21 
In other words, it is suggested that, in the same way as we use the concept 
knowledge as an heuristic for epistemic assessments, we use the word ‘know’ as an 
heuristic to communicate these assessments. If this is correct, it is not surprising 
that ‘knowledge’ ascriptions (typically) have the function of recommending or not 
recommending various actions in contexts where the point is to make a practical 
decision. In this respect, the hypothesis of a regularised pragmatic effect of 
‘knowledge’ ascriptions is not ad hoc. 
In summary, the explanation of the guiding claim requires the assumption 
that using the concept knowledge is a good heuristic for epistemic assessments of 
action. The plausibility of this assumption is supposed to rely in turn upon the 
truth of Normal Coincidence. For if the epistemic warrant required for action is, in 
                                                        
20 Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 120. 
21 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 189. 
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normal contexts, frequently (much) higher or lower than knowledge-level 
warrant, the supposed heuristic could not constitute a good trade-off. Thus, 
although Gerken's proposal invokes default conceptualisations, Normal 
Coincidence remains the cornerstone of his general approach. 
3. Normal Coincidence 
It is now time to assess Gerken’s proposal. As we have seen, it consists of three 
essential claims. First, there is WA. Second, there is NC. Third, there is the claim 
that NC explains the prominence of ‘know’ by supporting the hypothesis that 
knowledge-based assessment constitutes a good heuristic for practical reasoning 
and epistemic evaluation of action. 
To begin with, consider NC. NC seems to rely on an unsupported frequency 
assumption, namely, that knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary. Indeed, 
according to Gerken, low stakes cases such as the following do not require 
knowledge-level warrant: 
KICKOFF. S believes that the game has started. But the only basis for her belief is 
that she vaguely remembers a stranger telling her the time of the kick-off in the 
bar the night before. But both S and the testifier were tipsy, and the fellow didn’t 
seem all that reliable anyhow.22  
Suppose that S turns on the TV on the basis of his belief that the game has 
started, and assume that, given that the cost of error is low and the reward in 
accuracy is high, S’s action is warranted. There is no reason to think that this kind 
of situation is exceptional. There are plenty of cases where we do not have much 
evidence in favour of a certain proposition, and still act on it. If the warrant 
account is true, these situations are typically ones in which a significantly low 
warrant for action is required, presumably a warrant lower than knowledge-level. 
If we frequently face these kinds of situations, then a warrant lower than 
knowledge-level is frequently sufficient. Since it’s not at all implausible that we 
very frequently face very low stakes situations, the assumption that knowledge-
level warrant is frequently necessary for rational action is at best ill-motivated. 
One might want to reply that knowledge-level warrant is not that high. We 
frequently reach it in ordinary life. But this reply makes the claim that knowledge-
level warrant is very frequently sufficient less plausible. For, if knowledge-level 
warrant is low, we should expect it to be very frequently necessary and merely 
                                                        
22 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 145. 
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frequently sufficient. Since Normal Coincidence has it that knowledge-level 
warrant is very frequently sufficient, it suggests that the standards for knowledge 
are not that low. But then, why assume that in frequent (normal) ordinary 
contexts, knowledge-level warrant is necessary? Although these considerations do 
not constitute a knock-down argument against NC, they suggest that NC is ad hoc, 
for NC is based on an unsupported frequency assumption.  
Further, given the warrant account, we should expect NC to be false. 
Indeed, according to NC, normal practical situations are roughly uniform regarding 
the degree of warrant required for appropriate or rational action. But according to 
WA, there are many parameters which are relevant to determine the deliberative 
context. They can combine in many different ways. Presumably, each one can 
affect the epistemic warrant more or less strongly. But, if so, given all the ways in 
which these parameters can combine and the different degrees to which they can 
affect the epistemic warrant, it is very surprising that these parameters provide in 
frequent normal cases more or less the same epistemic condition. This is a second 
reason to think that NC is ad hoc. 
The problem comes from the fact that, on Gerken’s view, knowledge-level 
warrant is supposed to be independent of the practical situation and invariant, 
whereas the degree of warrant required for action is supposed to be sensitive to 
many practical factors to various degrees, and hence, very flexible. Given this, NC 
looks like a miracle. 
On this score, compare the strategy deployed by Gerken to the strategy 
deployed by Douven with respect to the norm of assertion. Douven argues in 
favour of a rational credibility norm for assertion. According to him, we may 
explain why ‘know’ is a prominent term of epistemic assessment of assertions on 
the basis of the consideration that most of the time, what is rationally credible is 
known (most of the time, we believe what is rational to believe and our rational 
beliefs are true and not true by mere luck).23 On this view, there is a normal 
coincidence between knowledge and rational credibility because the epistemic 
requirement for knowledge and rational credibility is the same. But if there is no 
independent reason to think that normal practical contexts are (roughly) uniform 
regarding the different parameters that they involve, NC is most unexpected. 
Consider now the claim that NC explains the prominence of ‘know.’ NC 
explains the prominence of ‘know’ only if it supports the hypothesis that 
                                                        
23 Igor Douven, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility,” Philosophical Review 115, 4 
(2006): 469-470. 
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knowledge-based assessments constitute a good heuristic for practical reasoning 
and epistemic evaluation of action. This seems to suggest that NC can explain the 
prominence of ‘know’ only if it implies either that (1) knowledge-level warrant is 
frequently necessary and sufficient (in normal contexts), or (2) knowledge-level 
warrant is frequently close enough to the warrant which is frequently necessary 
and sufficient (in normal contexts).  
Consider the first possibility: 
Normal Coincidence* (NC*). In normal cases of epistemic assessment, the degree 
of warrant necessary for S’s knowing that p is frequently necessary and sufficient 
for the epistemic permissibility of S’s acting on (the belief that) p 
The idea is that if knowledge-level warrant were frequently not necessary 
and sufficient (in normal contexts), then using ‘know’ (and the concept know) in 
ordinary assessments of action would be frequently too strong or to weak. Using 
‘know’ (and the concept know) would be frequently inaccurate (in normal 
contexts) and could not constitute a good trade-off.  
However, NC does not entail NC*. Suppose that there are seven cases out of 
ten in which knowledge-level warrant is necessary, so that we may say that 
knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary. And suppose that there are nine 
cases out of ten where knowledge-level warrant is sufficient, so that we may say 
that knowledge-level warrant is very frequently sufficient. In this situation, it’s 
possible that only six cases out of ten are cases in which knowledge-level is 
necessary and sufficient. This may mean that knowledge-level warrant is not 
frequently necessary and sufficient, even if knowledge-level warrant is frequently 
necessary and very frequently sufficient.  
The following table illustrates the situation (where ‘N’ stands for 
‘knowledge-level warrant is necessary’ and ‘S’ stands for ‘knowledge-level warrant 
is sufficient’): 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
N N N N N N N    
 S S S S S S S S S 
 N&S N&S N&S N&S N&S N&S    
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Of course, it is possible to stipulate afterwards a threshold for “frequent” and 
“very frequent” such that in the case under consideration knowledge-level warrant 
is frequently necessary and sufficient. For example, we may stipulate that “six cases 
out of ten” counts as “frequent.” 
However, this does not get us very far, for if we postulate that “six cases out 
of ten” counts as “frequent,” then the following table is possible given NC: 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
N N N N N N     
 S S S S S S S S S 
 N&S N&S N&S N&S N&S     
 
In this table, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary (by 
assumption) and very frequently sufficient, but it seems false that knowledge-level 
warrant is frequently necessary and sufficient, for there are only five cases of that 
sort. If one wants to maintain afterwards that “five cases out of ten” can count as 
“frequent,” we can repeat the operation. 
Second, we should note that the lower the assumed threshold for “frequent,” 
the less plausible is the claim that using the concept knowledge and the word 
‘know’ constitute good heuristics for practical reasoning and epistemic assessments 
of action. For example, we may accept that “six cases out of ten” counts as 
“frequent,” but then it becomes difficult to argue on this basis that using the 
concept knowledge and the word ‘know’ constitutes a good trade-off. Gerken’s 
approach does not fit well with the idea that the threshold for “frequent” could be 
that low. 
In any case, it’s clear that the more cases we postulate in which knowledge-
level warrant is necessary and sufficient, the more ad hoc and implausible the 
proposal is. Indeed, assuming WA and NC, we have reason to expect that cases in 
which knowledge-level warrant is necessary and sufficient should be the 
exception, rather than the rule.  
First, suppose (following NC) that knowledge-level warrant is very 
frequently sufficient. Presumably, this is so either because knowledge-level 
warrant is quite high, or because in these very frequent cases the warrant required 
for action is quite low. In either case, this seems to conflict with the claim that 
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knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary in these cases. For if knowledge-
level warrant level is frequently necessary in these cases, this is so either because 
knowledge-level warrant is quite low, or because in these cases the warrant 
required for action is quite high. In other words, there is no reason to expect cases 
in which knowledge-level warrant is sufficient to be cases in which knowledge-
level warrant is necessary; and there is no reason to expect cases in which 
knowledge-level warrant is necessary to be cases in which knowledge-level 
warrant is sufficient. Therefore, there is no reason to expect many cases in which 
knowledge-level warrant is necessary and sufficient.   
Second, the stipulation that knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary 
and sufficient requires treating many normal practical situations uniformly by 
assuming that they require exactly knowledge-level warrant (no more, no less). 
But, as said above, given WA, we should not expect normal practical situations to 
be uniform, and let alone in this way.  
Consider now the second possibility, according to which, in normal cases, 
knowledge-level warrant is frequently close (enough) to the epistemic warrant 
required for acting on p: 
NC** In normal cases of epistemic assessment, the degree of warrant necessary for 
S’s knowing that p is frequently close to the warrant necessary and sufficient for 
the epistemic permissibility of S’s acting on (the belief that) p 
First, note that NC doesn’t entail NC** either. For it is possible that 
knowledge-level warrant is very frequently sufficient and frequently necessary, 
but (a) the cases in which knowledge-level warrant is necessary and sufficient are 
not frequent, (b) the very frequent cases in which knowledge-level warrant is 
sufficient require much less than knowledge-level warrant, and (c) the frequent 
cases in which knowledge-level warrant is necessary require much more than 
knowledge-level warrant, so that NC is true but NC** is false.  
The following table illustrates this possibility (where ‘N’ stands for 
‘knowledge-level warrant is necessary’ and ‘S’ stands for ‘knowledge-level warrant 
is sufficient,’ ‘+’ stands for ‘much more than knowledge-level warrant’ and ‘-’ 
stands for ‘much less than knowledge-level warrant’): 
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S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
N&+ N N N N N N    
 S S S S S S S&- S&- S&- 
 N&S N&S N&S N&S N&S N&S    
 
Since this distribution is possible given NC, NC is still insufficient to explain 
the prominence of ‘know.’ 
Further, the arguments to the effect that NC and NC* are ad hoc apply 
equally well to NC**. First, NC** also relies on an unsupported frequency claim. 
Second, given WA we have no reason to expect normal cases to be uniform with 
respect to the degree of warrant required. Therefore, we should not expect most of 
these cases to be distributed around knowledge-level warrant.  
Finally, some may think that ‘know’ is vague, and so that what ‘knowledge 
level’ warrant really amounts to is also vague. On this view, even if, given WA, 
there are many parameters which can affect the warrant, in normal cases, they do 
not affect the required warrant strongly enough to require more or less than what 
can count as knowledge-level warrant: 
NC*** In normal cases of epistemic assessment, the warrant necessary and 
sufficient for the epistemic permissibility of S’s acting on (the belief that) p 
frequently falls within the borderline area for knowledge-level warrant. 
However, NC*** does not follow from NC either. Suppose we grant NC but 
(a) the cases in which knowledge-level warrant is necessary and sufficient are not 
frequent, (b) the very frequent cases in which knowledge-level warrant is 
sufficient require much less than knowledge-level warrant, and (c) the frequent 
cases in which knowledge-level warrant is necessary require much more than 
knowledge-level warrant. NC is true but NC*** is false. 
Further, the claim that the warrant required for appropriately relying on a 
proposition in action falls within the borderline area for knowledge level warrant 
is also open to the objection raised against NC, NC* and NC**. NC*** is an 
unsupported assumption about frequency, and given WA, we have no reason to 
expect NC*** to be the case. Appealing to the vagueness of ‘know’ does not help to 
save the proposal from ad hocness. 
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4. Normal and Abnormal Situations 
In this section, I wish to consider whether we can defend Gerken’s approach by 
insisting that it is only in normal cases of epistemic assessments that the frequency 
assumption applies. 
An advocate of the warrant account could insist that cases in which the 
frequency assumption is false are (very) frequently abnormal. And even if practical 
parameters can combine in many different ways and affect the warrant to various 
degrees, it may be suggested that it is mostly in abnormal cases that they affect the 
warrant in such a way that (much) more or less than knowledge-level warrant is 
required. 
The invocation of a distinction between normal and abnormal practical 
situations is problematic, though. First, the claim that ‘know’ is prominent in 
epistemic assessments of action is partially a statistical claim regarding the 
frequency of our actual epistemic assessments. In contrast, Normal Coincidence is a 
claim about a statistical fact given normal (epistemic and practical) circumstances. 
But if one thinks that normal practical situations are not necessarily the most 
frequent in the actual circumstances, then it is difficult to see how Normal 
Coincidence could help in explaining the fact that ‘know’ is (statistically) 
prominent in actual circumstances.  
Second, on Gerken's approach, the notion of abnormal practical 
circumstances seems to be sometimes determined in terms of frequency, and 
sometimes not. Consider Brown's surgeon case: 
SURGEON. A student is spending the day shadowing a surgeon. In the morning 
he observes her in clinic examining patient A who has a diseased left kidney. The 
decision is taken to remove it that afternoon. Later, the student observes the 
surgeon in theatre where patient A is lying anaesthetised on the operating table. 
The operation hasn’t started as the surgeon is consulting the patient’s notes. The 
student is puzzled and asks one of the nurses what’s going on:  
Student: I don’t understand. Why is she looking at the patient’s records? She was 
in clinic with the patient this morning. Doesn’t she even know which kidney it 
is? 
Nurse: Of course, she knows which kidney it is. But, imagine what it would be 
like if she removed the wrong kidney. She shouldn’t operate before checking the 
patient’s records.24  
                                                        
24 Brown, “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” 176. 
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About this kind of case, Gerken writes: 
For example, it should be clear enough that the practical contexts in [such cases] 
are abnormal due to the abnormally high stakes. Again, a broad externalist 
consideration motivates this assumption. It is infrequent that a single action 
determines life or death.25 
Here, it seems that the fact that a kind of action is not frequent makes it 
abnormal. However, Gerken continues: 
Of course, surgeons face life-or-death scenarios more frequently. But this may be 
acknowledged by saying that surgeons are frequently in contexts with abnormally 
high stakes.26 
Here, it seems that the fact that the action is frequent does nothing to show 
that it is normal. As a result, it is very unclear how frequency and normality are 
related, and hence, it is difficult to see whether this distinction can help to show 
that there is no tension between the warrant account and Normal Coincidence. 
Perhaps by ‘normality’ Gerken means the (relative) frequency for the 
average individual. However, it is still problematic to classify cases with high 
stakes (like the surgeon's case) as abnormal on the basis of the fact that they feature 
high stakes. This would manifest a tendency to categorize most of the practical 
situations in which the practical factors are such that they require a warrant 
(much) stronger (or weaker, if the stakes are very low) than knowledge as 
abnormal. But then, Normal Coincidence (or the alternative frequency assumption) 
would be trivially true, for given the very notion of a normal practical situation 
used, most situations in which (much) more or less than knowledge-level warrant 
is required would count as abnormal situations.  
In light of these considerations, it is hard to see how an advocate of the 
warrant account could appeal to the distinction between normal and abnormal 
practical situations: either normality is not defined in terms of frequency, and 
hence Normal Coincidence is insufficient to explain the prominence of ‘know’ in 
actual epistemic assessments of actions; or normality is defined in terms of 
frequency, and then, given all the different ways in which the practical factors can 
combine and affect the warrant, it is quite suprising that most normal practical 
situations require exactly, or something very close to, knowledge-level warrant. 
                                                        
25 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 143. 
26 Gerken, On Folk Epistemology, 144. 
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5. Conclusion 
It is indisputable that ‘know’ (and its cognates) is prominent in ordinary epistemic 
assessments of action. Any satisfactory account of the epistemic norm of action 
must provide an explanation of this fact. Satisfying this constraint is easy for the 
knowledge account, but it is more challenging for alternative accounts. While 
rejecting the knowledge account, Gerken has developed an explanation relying on 
the assumption that, in normal cases of epistemic assessments, knowledge-level 
warrant is very frequently necessary and frequently sufficient (Normal 
Coincidence). On this view, conceptualising our assessments in terms of 
knowledge and using the word ‘know’ (and its cognates) in evaluation of action 
and practical reasoning would be a good heuristic. I have argued, however, that 
this proposal is ad hoc, for it relies on an unsupported frequency assumption which 
we should expect to be false given the warrant account Gerken also embraces. 
Further, as such, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that 
knowledge-based assessments of action and practical reasoning constitute a good 
heuristic, and alternatives to Normal Coincidence which seem better placed in this 
respect seem even more ad hoc.27 
                                                        
27 I would like to thank Davide Fassio, Jie Gao, Arturs Logins and Santiago Echeverri for very 
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the SoPhA congress in Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Thanks to the audience for their comments. 
The work on this paper was supported by the SNSF research project ‘Rationality and Reflection’ 
(grant number 178039). 
